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Introduction 
 
The Haiti Cholera case has rightfully received significant attention from practitioners, scholars, the 
media, and the wider public. The facts lend themselves to a thorough examination of issues arising 
from U.N. immunity, not only in relation to the case but more broadly in relation to U.N. 
peacekeeping operations.  At the outset of the case scholars provided useful and well-needed 
explanations of the legal issues, exposing the gaps that the U.N. has exploited in order to avoid its 
responsibilities to the cholera victims. Two central issues are the distinction between public and 
private acts for the purposes of dispute settlement, and also the discussion about whether U.N. 
immunity under Section 2 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United 
Nations (CPIUN) is dependent upon the Organisation upholding its Section 29 obligations to 
provide alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. Academic writings on those matters have been 
crucial for practitioners, academics, and indeed the media, drawing upon cases and scholarship from 
various jurisdictions that had addressed similar or related questions in order to provide explanations 
of the law.  
 
A central role of the academy and of scholars is to bring together a range of sources to analyse and 
interpret questions of international law. Indeed, many of the early materials published about the 
Haiti Cholera case have been cited in documents presented to the New York District Court, have 
been relied upon by journalists, and are even distilled into accessible language and made available 
on many websites. As such, description about the various stages of the case and discussions about 
the relevant sources are well-understood within and beyond the academy. It serves little purpose, 
therefore, simply to repeat the points made by other scholars and practitioners over recent years. 
Instead, it is the responsibility of academics to set out alternative approaches that may provide fresh 
                                                     
1 Parts of this paper and the ideas contained herein first appeared in R. Freedman, ‘UN Immunity or Impunity?: A 
Human Rights Based Challenge’ (2014) 25 EJIL 239; and R. Freedman and N. Lemay-Hébert, ‘Jistis ak reparasyon pou 
tout viktim kolera MINUSTAH: The United Nations and the Right to Health in Haiti’ (2015) 28 Leiden Journal of 
International Law (forthcoming). 
2 Senior Lecturer, Law School, University of Birmingham [R.A.Freedman@bham.ac.uk]. 
3 Senior Lecturer, International Development Department, University of Birmingham [n.lemayhebert@bham.ac.uk]. 
and nuanced interpretations of the relevant laws in order to assist those who seek to find a solution 
to the cholera claims.  
 
One main reason why practitioners and judges turn to and cite the writing of academics is that 
scholarship ought to be, and often is, at the cutting edge of its field. The approaches outlined in 
early scholarship on the Haiti Cholera case necessarily addressed the traditional and typically 
conservative approaches to the issue of U.N. immunity. It is clear that the New York District Court 
at first instance was unwilling to go beyond those traditional interpretations. Therefore, restating 
and highlighting those matters does little to encourage a shift in paradigms, both in terms of the 
cholera claims and more broadly regarding the problems caused by outdated notions of absolute 
immunity operating within the contemporary and globalised world. As such, our paper will set out 
an alternative and viable approach to the Haiti Cholera case, and to the issue of U.N. absolute 
immunity by offering an interpretation based on international human rights law. 
 
Our thesis is that U.N. immunity ought not only to be dealt with by reference to the CPIUN but that 
it needs to be interpreted within the broader context of international human rights law. It is widely-
accepted that an individual’s fundamental right to access a court and a remedy is enshrined not only 
in international human rights law treaties but also has achieved the status of customary international 
law.4 Adopting a human rights-based approach, U.N. immunity ought not to be upheld where it 
precludes any individual realising his or her right to access and a court and a remedy. The human 
rights based-approach would therefore restrict immunity in circumstances where the U.N. fails to 
set up alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, as has occurred in the Haiti Cholera case. This is 
not the first case to address such issues, but in many ways the Haiti Cholera case provides the 
perfect set of facts for a national court finally to recognise that the U.N. cannot avoid its human 
rights obligations by hiding behind the cloak of immunity. This short paper will explore how and 
why the Haiti Cholera case provides the perfect facts for a human rights-based challenge to U.N. 
immunity.  
 
1. The Facts 
The facts of the Haiti Cholera case are well-known. The cholera epidemic started in the Artibonite 
region in October 2010. Prior to that, there had been no recorded cases of cholera in Haiti for over a 
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century.5 The population was therefore immunologically naive and highly susceptible to infection.6 
Between October and December 2010, approximately 150,000 people contracted cholera and 3,500 
had died; by the end of 2014, more than 8,813 people had died and over 725,608 individuals had 
been infected, making it one of the most deadly cholera outbreaks in recent history.  
 
A Nepalese battalion arrived in Haiti in October 2010 and was deployed to the Mirebalais camp 
during October 2010.7 It is important to note that Nepal suffered cholera outbreaks only weeks 
before the troops’ deployment.8 French epidemiologist Renaud Piarroux, who wrote an initial report 
on the cholera outbreak,9 stated that all of the scientific evidence demonstrates that the cholera is 
attributable to the Nepalese contingent travelling from a country experiencing a cholera epidemic, 
and that faecal contamination of the Meille River10 draining into the Artibonite River initiated the 
epidemic.11 The Artibonite River is one of the nation’s largest and most important rivers providing 
water to 1.5 million people.12 The link with the South Asian strain has been confirmed by numerous 
field investigations13 including the U.N.’s Independent Panel of Experts on the Cholera Outbreak in 
Haiti.14 Despite recent scientific debates, it is now increasingly accepted that the cholera outbreak is 
directly attributable to Nepalese peacekeeping troops, even by the U.N. itself.15 
 
There is still confusion about whether or not the soldiers were tested prior to their deployment.16 
What is clear is that the cholera screening protocols were inadequate to prevent the Haitian 
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<http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2010/101215_Guest.doc.htm>; see also: CNN Wire Staff, ‘UN investigates 
allegations of cholera source in Haiti’ CNN (Washington, 28 October 2010). 
epidemic.17 The problem was not just the lack of appropriate testing: The Medical Support Manual 
for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations does not list cholera and diarrhoea as conditions 
precluding peacekeeping service, and examination only has to take place within three months of 
deployment, leaving plenty of time for soldiers to contract the disease.18  
 
After the outbreak the international aid machinery led by the U.N. failed to take the steps necessary 
to contain and eradicate cholera in Haiti. Firstly, the U.N.’s World Health Organisation (WHO) and 
other actors battled against mass vaccination in Haiti, citing cost, logistical challenges and limited 
vaccine supplies.19 Secondly, the U.N. failed to invest in a large-scale improvement of Haiti’s water 
and sanitation systems before and immediately after the cholera outbreak, despite the peacekeeping 
mission’s mandate to capacity-build and improve national infrastructure. In January 2011, 37.6 % 
of peacekeeping camps lacked water and 28.5 % did not have a single toilet.20 One Médecins Sans 
Frontières official stated that ‘the inadequate cholera response in Haiti makes for a damning 
indictment of an international aid system’,21 especially the cluster system set up by the U.N.’s 
Office of the Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs.  
 
 
2. The Claims 
The attribution of responsibility to the U.N. for the outbreak and spread of cholera in Haiti is clearly 
documented. Victims of that outbreak, however, have been denied their fundamental right to access 
a court and a remedy owing to the U.N. failing to set up mechanisms to hear such claims. The case 
brought before the New York District Court focuses on the U.N. failure not only to protect Haitians 
from the introduction of cholera and to prevent the spread and continued existence of the disease, 
but also to provide a remedy to individuals affected by the outbreak. Claims and a pending appeal 
filed in a New York District Court on behalf of 5,000 individuals affected by cholera in Haiti22 
allege negligence, gross negligence and/or recklessness by the U.N. and MINUSTAH. The lawsuit 
states that U.N. actions and failures to act are  
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  ‘the direct and proximate cause of the cholera related deaths and serious illnesses in Haiti 
to date, and of those certain to come. The U.N. did not adequately screen and treat 
personnel coming to Haiti from cholera stricken regions. It did not adequately maintain its 
sanitation facilities or safely manage waste disposal. It did not properly conduct water 
quality testing or maintain testing equipment. It did not take immediate corrective action in 
response to the cholera outbreak.’23 
 
The U.N. response to the requests for compensation for the victims and to the lawsuit has been to 
insist on absolute immunity from the jurisdiction of national courts.24 It has altogether failed to 
address the substance of the claims – that it was responsible for the cholera and therefore liable to 
the victims. Instead, the U.N. insists that the claims are ‘not receivable’25 because it asserts that the 
claims involve review of political and policy matters.26  
 
The attempt to bring the U.N. to court was rejected at first instance, and an appeal is currently 
pending. Judge Oetken in the New York District Court upheld U.N. absolute immunity. However, 
the main issue in terms of U.N. immunity and international human rights law, and an issue that 
Judge Oetken altogether failed to address, is whether U.N. immunity can be upheld if in so doing an 
individual’s fundamental right to access a court and a remedy is violated. It is this issue – rather 
than Judge Oetken’s judgment and the pending appeal – that we shall explore in this paper. 
 
 
3. Absolute Immunity and Alternative Dispute Resolution 
The absolute immunity that the U.N. is relying upon is set out in Section 2 of CPIUN, which 
establishes that:  
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‘The United Nations, its property and assets wherever located and by whomsoever held, 
shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except insofar as in any particular 
case it has expressly waived its immunity.’27  
 
Section 2 is generally interpreted as granting the U.N. absolute immunity from jurisdiction of 
national courts28 – an approach based on the U.N. Charter and the CPIUN pre-dating the move to 
restrictive immunity.29  That approach can be seen, for example, in the early case of Manderlier v 
Organisation des Nations Unies et l’Etat Belge30 (1966) and in cases ranging from employment 
disputes31 to damages arising from peacekeeping operations.32 Traditional justification for absolute 
immunity is that national courts (a) would have very different interpretations to one another; and (b) 
may be open to prejudice or frivolous actions within some countries.33  
 
The same Convention sets out that the U.N. must provide mechanisms to resolve claims arising out 
of disputes of a private law character. Section 29 of the CPIUN mandates that:   
 
‘The United Nations shall make provisions for appropriate modes of settlement of: 
(a) disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of a private law character to 
which the United Nations is a party;’ 
 
It is important to understand the Section 29 obligations in terms of peacekeeping operations. It is 
clear that UN peacekeepers require immunity in order to fulfil their functions and because countries 
might otherwise be reluctant to commit their troops as peacekeepers.34 The functioning of judicial 
systems in conflict or fragile states might lead to peacekeepers’ own rights, such as to a fair trial, 
being violated should such immunity not exist. As a result there needs to be an appropriate means of 
                                                     
27 UN General Assembly Resolution 22(1), ‘Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations’, 13 
February 1946, Section 2.  
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15-045, at 491. 
34 Cf. Clark, ‘Peacekeeping Forces, Jurisdiction and Immunity: A Tribute To George Barton’ (2012) 43 Victoria 
University of Wellington Law Review 77. 
dispute resolution provided for instances where peacekeepers’ actions are criminal offences or give 
rise to private law claims.  
 
Provision of appropriate dispute settlement is set out in the UN’s ‘Model Status of Forces 
Agreement for Peace-Keeping Operations’.35 The Model SOFA sets out that where the 
peacekeeping operation or its members have immunity from jurisdiction of local courts in respect of 
a private law claim, the Model SOFA provides for alternative dispute settlement mechanisms36 - 
namely, claims commissions.37 Yet, to date the U.N. has failed to establish any mechanisms to hear 
cholera victims’ claims in line with its Section 29 obligations either through the methods set out in 
Article 51 of the Model SOFA or any other alternative modes of dispute resolution available to it 
such as ad hoc negotiation, conciliation, mediation or arbitration, and lump-sum settlements.38 
Indeed, the attempt to bring the U.N. before the New York District Court is a direct result of the 
U.N. refusing to establish any alternative mechanisms for resolving the cholera victims’ disputes.   
 
One issue, and the main one focused upon in the Judge Oetken’s judgment, is whether Section 29 is 
a counterbalance to Section 2 or whether the two operate independently of one another. If the two 
were interdependent then it would be clear that the U.N. failure to establish mechanisms in line with 
Section 29 CPIUN undermines its ability to rely on the immunity set out under Section 2 of that 
Convention. However, case law and treaty interpretation points towards the conclusion that U.N. 
immunity is not conditional on alternative dispute mechanisms being established.39  Our thesis does 
not interrogate that oft-discussed argument, but rather looks at a separate and more holistic issue: 
the ability of the U.N. to rely on absolute immunity where in so doing an individual’s fundamental 
rights are violated. This second issue receives less attention than the one focused upon by Judge 
Oetken.  
 
The question is whether Section 2 CPIUN, in absentia of the U.N. implementing its obligations 
under Section 29, can be given effect where it violates fundamental an individual’s right to access a 
court and a remedy. It is this issue that we shall focus upon because the human rights-based 
                                                     
35 Model status of forces agreement for peace-keeping operations UN Doc. A/45/594 (1990), Article 51. 
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approach is one that is increasingly applied to other international organisations and the Haiti 
Cholera case provides the perfect facts for demonstrating that the U.N. ought also to be constrained 
from using its immunity to violate individuals’ fundamental rights. 
 
 
4. The Human Rights-Based Challenge 
Judge Oetken, following jurisprudence from US and European courts, determined only to address 
the interpretation of the CPIUN. The legal reasoning contained within the judgement, and that 
follows on from cases such as Brzak40 and Sadikoglu,41 focuses on whether immunity was intended 
to be contingent upon the provision of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. That narrow 
approach, however, fails to take into account the violation of the fundamental right to access a court 
and a remedy that occurs where the U.N. uses the cloak of immunity whilst refusing to provide 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. When the CPIUN is situated within the broader context 
of U.N. human rights obligations, it is clear that the immunity under Section 2 may only be legally 
valid if there are mechanisms available to ensure that claimants have access to an alternative 
process to decide and remedy private law claims as otherwise Section 2 would violate individuals’ 
fundamental rights to access a court and a remedy.  
 
This is an argument that was presented on behalf of the Plaintiffs in the Haiti Cholera case, and that 
has been argued in European cases as well as in academic scholarship, but is one that Judge Oetken 
failed to mention let alone address in his judgement. It is this issue that forms the heart of our 
argument: U.N. immunity in absentia of an alternative dispute resolution mechansism may violate 
the fundamental right to access a court and a remedy,42 and therefore must be overridden in respect 
of those private law claims where the U.N. fails to fulfil its Section 29 obligations.        
 
There is increasing recognition that where alternative dispute resolution mechanisms are not 
available a claimant’s fundamental rights may be violated. Individuals hold fundamental rights to 
access a court and to seek a remedy.43. Appropriate modes of settling disputes44 enable claimants to 
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43 Those rights are found within the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and 
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applying to international organisations (at 211-212) and noted that such mechanisms provide the counterpart to 
international organisations’ immunity (at 212). 
access a court or a remedy through alternative mechanisms. According to Reinisch, those 
mechanisms are ‘increasingly also seen as a legal requirement stemming from treaty obligations 
incumbent upon international organizations, as well as a result of human rights obligations 
involving access to justice.’45  
 
Dannenbaum insists that the U.N. also is legally bound by international human rights law.46 The 
U.N. legal personality means that it is bound by customary international law and this includes 
certain human rights.47 U.N. Charter provisions, including Articles 1(3), 55 and 56,  also require the 
U.N. to respect human rights.48 U.N. member states arguably have a positive duty to enforce the 
Charter’s human rights obligations ‘over and above any other international law granting 
immunity’.49 The position that the U.N. has immunity even where that would violate human rights 
has been deemed ‘counterintuitive’.50 As a result, a human rights-based approach to U.N.. immunity 
has been developing over the past four decades.51  
 
The Appeals Court in Manderlier v Organisation des Nations Unies et l’Etat Belge52 (1969) paves 
the way for a potential human rights-based challenge to UN immunity. The Appeals Court criticised 
‘the present state of international institutions [being that] there is no court to which the appellant 
can submit his dispute with the United Nations’ as being a situation that ‘does not seem to be in 
keeping with the principles proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’.53 The case 
highlights the tension between absolute immunity and human rights.   
 
Urban v United Nations (1985) emphasised that a ‘court must take great care not to unduly impair 
[a litigant’s] constitutional right of access to courts’. Although the court focused on a constitutional 
right, this might as easily have been an international human right. Whilst the tension was not fully 
explored owing to the facts, it does highlight that there is a lending towards rights of access to a 
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(2008) 7 Chinese Journal of International Law 285, 286. 
46 See, generally, T. Dannenbaum, ‘Translating the Standard of Effective Control into a System of Effective 
Accountability’ (2010) 51 Harvard International Law Journal 323, 323-327. 
47 Ibid., 323. 
48 Ibid. 
49 See, generally, Rios and Flaherty (n. 28). 
50 J. J. Paust, ‘The U.N. Is Bound By Human Rights; Understanding the Full Reach of Human Rights, Remedies, and 
Nonimmunity’ (2010) 51 Harvard International Law Journal (2010) 1, 9. 
51 Cf. Freedman (n. 1). 
52 In Manderlier v Belgium State and United Nations (Brussels Appeal Court) [1969] 69 ILR 139; United Nations 
Juridical Yearbook (1969), at 236-237 the Appeal Court held that failure under Section 29 had no bearing on the 
absolute immunity under Section 2. Therefore the plea of ‘no jurisdiction’ was upheld. 
53 Ibid. 
court. Given the developments in international human rights law, this tension might now resolve in 
human rights taking precedence.54  
 
The plaintiffs in Mothers of Srebrenica v State of the Netherlands and the United Nations (2008) 
claimed that the right to access a court provides an exception to the immunity principle.55 While 
that argument was not accepted by the District Court,56 the Court of Appeal in Mothers of 
Srebrenica v. State of the Netherlands and United Nations (2010)57 ruled that the UN could be 
joined to the case, thus setting aside its immunity under Section 2 of the CPIUN. The basis for 
setting aside the immunity was the right of an individual to access a court. The Court of Appeal 
held that the UN Charter and the CPIUN could not be used by states to avoid their ECHR 
obligations and it insisted that it was not precluded from testing the UN’s immunity against these 
provisions. After testing the UN’s immunity, and on the findings within that case, the Court of 
Appeal concluded that there would be no violation of the ECHR or ICCPR if a Dutch court upheld 
UN immunity within that particular case. While this case does not provide an example of when UN 
immunity may violate and individual’s right to access a court, based on its specific facts, it does 
demonstrate that courts have the jurisdiction to determine whether such a violation has occurred 
within the context of a specific case.  
 
These cases demonstrate that the door is now ajar for a human rights-based challenge to the UN’s 
immunity.58 Although in each case the courts found that alternative modes of settlement were 
available to the claimants, the seeds have been sown for a human rights-based challenge to succeed 
if such mechanisms are not in place.  
 
 
5. A Case for Change 
The U.N. cannot be viewed in a vacuum. A human rights-based challenge to immunity must be 
understood in the context of developments regarding other international organisations. Reinisch 
insists that international organisations ‘may be under a duty to provide’ access to courts or to a 
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the court considered the litigant to be ‘frivolous’ and seeking to ‘flood’ the court with ‘meritless, fanciful claims.’ 
55 Mothers of Srebrenica et al. v State of the Netherlands and the UN [2008] District Court in The Hague, 295247/HA 
ZA 07-2973.  
56 See, generally, G. den Dekker, ‘Immunity of the United Nations before the Dutch courts’ (2008) 3 The Hague Justice 
Journal < http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/index.php?id=11748 >. 
57 Mothers of Srebrenica v. Netherlands & United Nations [2010] Case No. 200.20.151/01, Judgment (Appeal Ct. 
Hague). 
58 Freedman (n. 1). 
remedy for potential claimants, without which ‘they may encounter difficulties in insisting on their 
immunity from suit in national courts’,59 and his view is reflected in judicial statements and 
decisions. 
 
The European Court of Human Rights has made clear that it regards the EU as bound by 
international human rights law. In Beer and Regan v Germany (1999)60 the Court considered that 
while immunities of international organisations might pursue a legitimate aim that would result in 
access to a court being restrained, this should not be absolute.  Although the Court did not state that 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms are a ‘strict prerequisite’ for immunity,61 it did stress that 
‘reasonable alternative means’ available to claimants62 are ‘a material factor’63 when assessing the 
proportionality of the restriction to the  right of access to a court.64 The need for alternative 
mechanisms was developed further in Siegler v Western European Union, (2003),65 where the Court 
held that immunity is conditional on the existence of alternative dispute settlement mechanisms, and 
that it must meet certain standards of due process.   
 
Other international tribunals have adopted similar positions to the ECtHR. The ILOAT in Chadsey 
v Universal Postal Union (1968) emphasised ‘the principle that any employee is entitled in the 
event of a dispute with his employer to the safeguard of some appeals procedure’.66 In a later case, 
the same tribunal extended that principle to ‘the safeguard of an impartial ruling by an international 
tribunal’.67 UNAT has relied upon the Chadsey ruling,68 both explicitly69 and implicitly by broadly 
interpreting its jurisdiction.70  
 
Courts seemingly approach international organisations as obligated to provide a reasonable legal 
remedy if there is no alternative and effective dispute settlement mechanism. Praust insists that this 
approach ‘must be approved’ because ‘it is justified by the human rights principle of access to 
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60 Beer and Reagan v Germany [2001] Application No. 28934/95, 33 EHRR 54 para. 58; Waite and Kennedy v 
Germany [2000] Application No. 26083/94, 30 EHRR 261 para.73. 
61 Reinisch (n. 41) 292. 
62 Waite and Kennedy (n. 56) para.73. 
63 Waite and Kennedy (n. 56) para.68. 
64 Reinisch, (n. 41) 292. 
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53 (BE 2003). 
66 Chadsey v Universal Postal Union [1969] ILO Administrative Tribunal, Judgement No. 122. 
67 Rubio v Universal Postal Union [1997] ILO Administrative Tribunal, Judgement No. 1644, para.12.  
68 For a discussion of these cases, see Reinisch (n. 41), 292-293.  
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courts.’71 The Haiti Cholera case provides the perfect facts for such an approach to be applied to the 
U.N.  
 
The outcome of a rights-based approach to U.N. would not be to remove immunity but to make it 
contingent on individuals being able to access a court and a remedy through the provision of 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. Indeed, that is simply a case of the U.N. adhering to its 
own framework for redressing injury outside of national courts. Implementing a rights-based 
approach to immunity would not result in cases being brought against the U.N. unless it fails to 
adhere to its obligations to provide appropriate mechanisms for victims to make claims. What a 
rights-based approach would do is to ensure that the U.N. foregrounds its human rights obligations 
and ensures that it does not violate the rights of individuals that it is supposed to protect. 
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